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8.1 Introduction
The Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–98 wrought havoc with the economies
of some of the world’s most successful performers. Three of the worst-
aﬀected countries (Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia) were forced to
call in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to embark on IMF-
supported—and IMF-designed—programs in order to cope with the ﬁ-
nancial crisis. In return for ﬁnancial assistance from the IMF (and other
multilateral and bilateral donors), these countries committed to ﬂoat their
exchange rates, raise interest rates, tighten ﬁscal policy (at least initially),
open up their ﬁnancial markets to foreigners, close troubled banks and ﬁ-
nancial institutions, and undertake a range of other structural reforms.
Malaysia took a diﬀerent path. Instead of going to the IMF, the Malay-
sian authorities imposed sweeping controls on capital account transactions,
ﬁxed the exchange rate at MYR3.80 per U.S. dollar (a rate that represented
a 10 percent appreciation relative to the level at which the ringgit had been
trading immediately before the controls), cut interest rates, and embarked
on a policy of reﬂation.
Did the Malaysian gamble pay oﬀ? Malaysia has recovered nicely since
the crisis, but so have Korea and Thailand, two countries that took the or-
thodox path. It is clear that some of the more pessimistic prognostications
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Rodrik gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the Ford Foundation.about the consequences of capital controls have not been borne out, but can
we say something more concrete about the relative merits of the capital con-
trols option as a crisis resolution strategy, at least in this particular case?
There has been increasing acceptance in recent years of capital controls
on inﬂows as a prudential measure aimed at preventing a buildup of short-
term foreign liabilities, particularly in lower-income countries that do not
have the capacity to put in place sophisticated ﬁnancial supervisory
regimes. In the words of Michael Mussa (2000), “[h]igh openness to inter-
national capital ﬂows, especially short-term credit ﬂows, can be dangerous
for countries with weak or inconsistent macro-economic policies or inade-
quately capitalized and regulated ﬁnancial systems.1 However, the use of
capital controls on outﬂows as a crisis resolution measure remains highly
controversial, despite a clear-cut economic rationale. As emphasized in
“second-generation” models of currency crises, a country can be faced with
creditor panic and a run on reserves even when it has strong fundamentals.
In these situations, a temporary suspension of capital account convertibil-
ity can halt the rush to the exits and provide time for policy makers to take
corrective action—it can “rule out the bad equilibrium by force majeure,”
in Krugman’s (1999a) words. However, the risk is that capital controls can
prove ineﬀective, undercut market conﬁdence even further, and be used to
delay needed adjustments.
In trying to determine the relative success of the Malaysian response to
the Asian crisis, we must evaluate the Malaysian controls from four diﬀer-
ent yet complementary perspectives.
The ﬁrst issue is narrowly ﬁnancial: Were the controls eﬀective in seg-
menting Malaysian financial markets from oﬀshore and international
capital markets? The increased sophistication of ﬁnancial markets, and in
particular the spread of derivatives (enabling speculators, for example,
to disguise short-term flows as direct foreign investment), has led many
observers to be skeptical of governments’ ability to target speciﬁc types of
balance-of-payments ﬂows for restriction.2 Indeed, one might have been
doubtful ex ante that the Malaysian government’s controls would have been
eﬀective in this sense.
Such doubts seem to have been misplaced. The government had no diﬃ-
culty in sharply lowering domestic interest rates and making the ﬁxed ex-
change rate stick without the appearance of a black-market premium for for-
eign currency. As an IMF report states, “there [were] only a few reports of
eﬀorts to evade controls, and no indications of circumvention through un-
derinvoicing or overinvoicing of imports” (Kochhar et al. 1999, 8). Another
IMF staﬀreport concludes that the controls were eﬀective in eliminating the
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1. Mussa precedes this statement by writing: “[T]he experience in recent ﬁnancial crises
could cause reasonable people to question whether liberal policies toward international capi-
tal ﬂows are wise for all countries in all circumstances. The answer, I believe, is probably not.”
2. See Garber (1998) for a useful discussion of the issues.oﬀshore ringgit market and choking oﬀspeculative activity against the ring-
git despite the easing of monetary and ﬁscal policies (Ariyoshi et al. 1999,
2:50–51). More systematic, comparative evidence is presented by Kaminsky
and Schmukler (2000) and Edison and Reinhart (2001). These papers ﬁnd
that the September 1998 controls were successful in lowering interest rates,
stabilizing the exchange rate, and reducing the comovement of Malaysian
overnight interest rates with regional interest rates.3
The second perspective is medium-term economic.Did the controls (com-
bined with ﬁscal and monetary reﬂation and a ﬁxed exchange rate) allow a
faster recovery from the economic crisis and a better economic perfor-
mance than would have been possible in their absence? In other words, was
the ﬁnancial segmentation put to good use? This is where considerable con-
troversy remains. The question is essentially whether Malaysia would have
been better oﬀ in the immediate aftermath of the crisis following the ortho-
dox, IMF-prescribed route that the other countries in the region followed.
This is the question on which our paper focuses.
Third, we have to contend with a broader politicalquestion, having to do
with the interaction of capital controls with political developments in
Malaysia. Opponents of capital controls often argue that controls enlarge
the scope for domestic political mischief. The possibility of corruption is
mentioned frequently. In Malaysia’s case, there is no indication of an in-
crease in petty corruption—the controls were implemented transparently
and with remarkable eﬃciency—but many knowledgeable observers have
complained about the intensiﬁcation of the regime’s cronyism. Jomo, for ex-
ample, argues that the controls served (in part) to bail out the regime’s
cronies:
The window of opportunity oﬀered by capital controls has been abused
by certain powerfully-connected business interests, not only to secure
publicly funded bail-outs at public expense, but even to consolidate and
extend their corporate domination, especially in the crucial ﬁnancial sec-
tor. Capital controls have been part of a package focused on saving
friends of the regime, usually at the public’s expense. (Jomo 2001, 215)4
It is also clear that the controls made it easier for Mahathir to get away with
ﬁring and humiliating his political rival Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim. In fact, Anwar was ﬁred just hours after the ringgit was pegged on
2 September. We shall not have much to say about this angle of the capital
controls, but we recognize that a broader evaluation has to take into ac-
count their potentially quite negative implications for political governance.
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3. Malaysia’s controls were the only ones that had this result among all the cases that these
authors studied. This may be attributed to the more comprehensive nature of the Malaysian
capital controls.
4. See also Johnson and Mitton (2001), which provides some evidence that ﬁrms connected
to Mahathir experienced a more signiﬁcant rebound in their stock prices subsequent to the im-
position of capital controls.Finally, one needs also to maintain a long-term perspective. Even if con-
trols are successful in the short run, it is possible that their long-term eco-
nomic consequences will prove damaging. If this were to prove the case,
Malaysia’s medium-term beneﬁts would have to be juxtaposed against
longer-term costs before one could determine whether the policies were ul-
timately worthwhile. In Malaysia’s case, one has to worry especially about
the impact on foreign direct investment (FDI). Such investment has played
an important role in the country’s successful economic development to
date, and a substantial drop in FDI would be likely to be bad news.5 The
Malaysian authorities were quite careful to target short-term speculative
capital ﬂows, insulating FDI, but there nevertheless remains the possibility
that the controls will have a long-term deterrent eﬀect on long-term in-
vestors. We will not have much to say on this issue, either. The controls are
too recent to ascertain with any degree of certainty their long-term conse-
quences.
With regard to the question that is our focus—did the controls help
Malaysia recover faster?—the prevailing view is that the answer remains
unclear (see, e.g., Dornbusch, chap. 9 in this volume). The imposition of
capital controls in Malaysia coincided with a general improvement in the
business climate in the region.6Most economic indicators for Thailand and,
especially, South Korea sharply turned upward just as Malaysia was begin-
ning its own recovery. By many measures, South Korea’s rebound since late
1998 has been more impressive than Malaysia’s.7
We shall argue that this type of comparison misses an important point.
In early September 1998, neither Korea nor Thailand faced another immi-
nent ﬁnancial crisis. Both had gone through an IMF program (or series of
programs), which, with some delay, had begun to restore market conﬁdence
in these economies. There was no reason to believe that their policy conﬁg-
urations on 1 September 1998 were fundamentally unsustainable. In fact,
sizable improvements in key indicators of market sentiment had already
taken place in the months preceding September. In both countries, interest
rates had come down sharply, the currency had appreciated signiﬁcantly,
and—at least in Korea’s case—there had been a large increase in foreign
currency reserves.
Contrast that with Malaysia’s situation. When the Malaysian authorities
instituted capital controls on 1 September 1998, they did so under the belief
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5. According to Athukorala (1998, 20), FDI contributed 73 percent of net capital inﬂows to
Malaysia between 1990 and 1994.
6. However, in many ways, the environment in the world was not as good as it had been a
year previously, when Thailand and Korea were implementing their IMF programs. Shortly
after the imposition of controls in Malaysia, both Brazil and Russia experienced severe crises.
Also, whereas Japanese imports had been rising in late 1997, they were in decline again by late
1998.
7. Malaysia suﬀered lower declines in real wages and manufacturing employment than Ko-
rea, however.that their existing policies were unsustainable because of intense and con-
tinued speculative pressure against the ringgit. Indeed, a simple indicator of
ﬁnancial market pressure that we will discuss later in the paper shows that
pressure on the ringgit reached its peak just before the Malaysian authori-
ties decided to implement capital controls. The most concrete form that the
speculation took was a large diﬀerential between onshore and oﬀshore in-
terest rates for ringgit deposits. Unlike in Korea and Thailand, where inter-
est rates had fallen to single-digit levels by the end of the summer, oﬀshore
ringgit deposits were paying rates in the range of 20–40 percent. Although
domestic interest rates remained stable due to an interest rate ceiling of 2.5
percentage points over the government-determined base lending rate
(Kochar et al. 1999, 62), the large onshore/oﬀshore interest rate diﬀerential
initiated massive capital ﬂight and a subsequent credit crunch. There was
widespread speculation in the market that Malaysia would be the next
country to go to the IMF.
Thus, when Malaysia altered its policies on 1 September, it did so because
its existing policies were unsustainable and ineﬀectual. It is hard to believe
that Malaysia would have experienced Thailand’s or Korea’s economic
performance in subsequent months while maintaining its existing policy
conﬁguration. We shall suggest a diﬀerent counterfactual, namely that the
alternative to the capital control strategy was to go to the IMF for
assistance—that is, to do what the other countries had done earlier. From
this perspective, the appropriate counterfactual for Malaysia is the perfor-
mance exhibited by the other countries subsequent to their resort to IMF
assistance. Formally, this calls for a time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
methodology to discern the economic consequences of the controls. In
other words, we shall treat the timing of the before and after comparisons
as country-speciﬁc, centering it on the date that each country called in the
IMF or, as in Malaysia’s case, imposed capital controls.
Later we discuss at length the identifying assumptions needed to make
the time shifting valid and the eﬀorts we have made to reduce possible bi-
ases. In particular, we try to control for the external environment (including
the decline in U.S. interest rates and the resumption of ﬂows to the region)
to ensure that our results are not biased by diﬀerences in the overall busi-
ness climate in the region at the time that each of the countries resorted to
its crisis resolution policy. If one accepts the identifying assumptions and is
persuaded by the robustness checks, the results are quite strong. We ﬁnd
that the Malaysian controls produced better results than the alternative in
almost all dimensions. On the real side, the economic recovery was faster,
and employment and real wages did not suﬀer as much. On the ﬁnancial
side, the stock market performed better, interest rates fell more, and in-
flation was lower. However, we will also present conventional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimates for the skeptic, which take 1 September 1998 as
the turning point for all the countries. These results are more mixed, but
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Korea and Thailand.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy review
the nature of the Malaysian controls and summarize existing evaluations of
their eﬀectiveness. Section 8.3 is devoted to methodological issues and dis-
cusses the appropriateness of time-shifted versus conventional diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences. In section 8.4 we present evidence that the timing of the
Malaysian ﬁnancial crisis diﬀered in signiﬁcant details from the Korean
and Thai crises. Section 8.5 presents the main empirical results. Section 8.6
discusses some alternative interpretations of the evidence. Finally, we oﬀer
concluding remarks in section 8.7.
8.2 Malaysia’s Capital Controls and Previous Evaluations
Malaysia entered the Asian ﬁnancial crisis with relatively strong funda-
mentals and (thanks to an earlier bout with restrictions on capital inﬂows
in 1994) a much smaller share of short-term external debt in total.8Table 8.1
shows some key ﬁnancial data. Malaysia’s short-term debt stood well below
its foreign exchange reserves, which made it less prone to a run by foreign
creditors. At the same time, as a country with a very high level of indebted-
ness overall, Malaysia was quite vulnerable to turnarounds in general mar-
ket sentiment that would be reﬂected in an increase in interest rates or re-
duction in credit availability.
Malaysia had the world’s highest stock market capitalization ratio (310
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Table 8.1 Financial and Debt Indicators, 1996
Malaysia South Korea Thailand
External debt/GDP 0.39 0.32 0.55
External debt/exports of goods and services 0.41 0.98 1.32
Short-term debt/GDP 0.11 0.20 0.21
Short-term debt/reserves 0.42 2.84 1.03
M2/GDP 1.00 0.46 0.79
M2/reserves 3.64 6.21 3.86
Claims on private sector/GDP 1.45 0.66 1.42
Current account balance (% of GDP) –4.9 –4.7 –7.9
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP) 310 29 54
Source: Institute of International Finance ([IIF] 1998), except for stock market capitalization, which
comes from the World Bank’s “Stock Market Capitalization as a Percent of GDP,” at [http://
wbln0018.worldbank.org/psd/compete.nsf/e376d12c87889e86852564900006610ce?Open/View].
8. In response to a surge of speculative inﬂows in late 1993 betting on an appreciation of the
ringgit, the Malaysian government imposed restrictions on the sale of short-term securities to
foreigners in January and February 1994. These restrictions resulted in a sharp reduction in
short-term liabilities. See Rodrik and Velasco (forthcoming).percent of gross domestic product [GDP], compared to 116 percent in the
United States and 29 percent in Korea). The rise in equity prices had in turn
contributed to a domestic lending boom, leaving Malaysia in mid-1997
with a domestic debt-GDP ratio (170 percent) that was among the highest
in the world (Perkins and Woo 2000, 237). Private-sector indebtedness was
higher than in Thailand and more than double the ratio in Korea. The stock
of M2 was equal to GDP (much higher than corresponding ratios for Ko-
rea and Thailand). During periods of ﬁnancial panic, all short-term lia-
bilities, whether domestic or foreign, become potential claims against the
government’s liquid foreign assets. These high levels of debt suggest that
Malaysia was not as well protected against ﬁnancial turbulence as its exter-
nal liquidity indicators would suggest.
In response to the Thai crisis and the reversal of capital ﬂows to the re-
gion, Malaysian authorities at ﬁrst implemented an orthodox adjustment
policy.9 Interest rates were raised to stem the decline of the ringgit, and in
December 1997 a drastic cut (18 percent) in government spending was an-
nounced. This policy package mimicked IMF programs elsewhere and was
pushed through by Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar also
made clear that he was committed to exchange rate ﬂexibility and that cap-
ital controls would not be implemented. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Dr.
Mahathir bin Mohamad was blowing oﬀ steam against ﬁnancial market
“speculators” and sending very diﬀerent signals.
The Malaysian economy failed to respond to the orthodox policies. Con-
sumption and investment demand plunged as a result of capital outﬂows,
high interest rates, and a pessimistic outlook. This gave the opponents of
Anwar’s policies the upper hand, and at the end of June 1998, Mahathir ap-
pointed Daim Zainuddin, a former ﬁnance minister, to be minister in charge
of “tasks relating to economic development.” Daim was told to formulate
an alternative to Anwar’s policies. Daim and Mahathir were intent on re-
ﬂating the economy through cuts in interest rates and credit expansion, but
there was little eﬀective change in monetary policies over the ensuing
months. The attempt to reduce domestic interest rates was undercut by
growing speculation against the ringgit in oﬀshore markets. Oﬀshore insti-
tutions (mainly in Singapore) borrowed ringgit at premium rates (double or
triple the prevailing interest rates in Malaysia) to purchase dollars and bet
in favor of the ringgit’s collapse. The economy’s decline continued. This was
the background against which the controls were instituted on 1 September.
The primary objective behind the capital controls was to end speculation
against the ringgit. Most of that speculation was coming from short-selling
of the ringgit in oﬀshore (mainly Singaporean) markets. These markets
were oﬀering high interest rates to attract ringgit deposits, which in turn
Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work? 399
9. This paragraph and the next are based on Haggard and Low (2000) and Perkins and Woo
(2000).served to fund the shorting of the currency. To shut down oﬀshore trading,
the government mandated that all sale of ringgit assets had to go through
authorized domestic intermediaries, eﬀectively making oﬀshore trading
illegal. All ringgit assets held abroad had to be repatriated. Worried that
these measures would lead to an outﬂow of capital and further depreciation
of the currency, the Malaysian government also banned for a period of one
year all repatriation of investment held by foreigners. Simultaneously, in an
attempt to revive aggregate demand, Malaysia lowered the three-month
Bank Negara intervention rate from 9.5 percent to 8 percent, and on 16
September, the liquid asset ratio was reduced from 17 percent to 15 percent
of total liabilities. On 15 February 1999, the Central Bank of Malaysia
changed the regulations on capital restrictions, shifting from an outright
ban to a graduated levy and replacing the levy on capital with a proﬁts levy
on future inﬂows. The controls are described more fully in the appendix.
The government was concerned about the impact of the controls on fu-
ture capital inﬂows, particularly of FDI, on which the Malaysian economy
is highly dependent. The authorities therefore took pains to ensure that the
controls would not aﬀect FDI or current account transactions. Repatria-
tion of proﬁts and dividends from (documented) FDI activities were freely
allowed. Foreign currency transactions for current account purposes (in-
cluding the provision of up to six months of trade credit for foreigners buy-
ing Malaysian goods) were also not restricted.
Early reactions to the controls ranged from cautious to hostile. The IMF
did not openly condemn Malaysian policies, but it did not hide its views
about their inappropriateness either. An IMF spokesman was quoted as
saying, “the IMF believes that any restrictions imposed on the movement
of capital [are] not conducive to building investor conﬁdence” (quoted in
“IMF suggests Malaysian move is a disincentive,” Asian Wall Street Jour-
nal, 2 September 1998, 2). Other observers were less circumspect. Oxford
Analytica’s Daily Brief headline declared, “Exchange controls will under-
mine Malaysian growth” (15 September 1998). An article in Forbes Inter-
national predicted, “Foreign investors in Malaysia have been expropriated,
and the Malaysians will bear the cost of their distrust for years” (Roche
1998). Moody’s downgraded Malaysian securities. Morgan Stanley
dropped Malaysia from its international index, stating that Malaysia would
permanently be excluded from it and that its previous inclusion had been a
mistake in the ﬁrst place.10 Spreads rose more than 200 basis points for
Malaysian bonds in September, while they declined for other East Asian
countries (with the exception of Indonesia).
Early prognostications of impending doom were gradually replaced by
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10. This is reported in Kochhar et al. (1999, 11). A year later, Morgan Stanley announced
that it would reinstate Malaysia in its index, explaining that many investors had remained in
the Malaysian market.more upbeat projections, as it became clear that Malaysia was recovering
rather than sinking deeper into crisis. It is instructive to follow the trans-
formation in the pages of successive World Economic Outlooks of the IMF:
[T]he introduction by Malaysia in early September of exchange and cap-
ital controls may also turn out to be an important setback not only to that
country’s recovery and potentially to its future development, but also to
other emerging market economies that have suﬀered from heightened in-
vestor fears of similar actions elsewhere. (October 1998, 4)
Despite stimulative monetary and ﬁscal policies introduced last year,
however,  domestic demand is expected to strengthen only gradually.
(May 1999, 19)
[A] strong economic recovery is also now underway in response to ﬁscal
and monetary stimulus and the pegging of the exchange rate at a com-
petitive level. (October 1999, 19)
In May 1999, Malaysia went back to the international market with a $1 bil-
lion bond issue, paying a premium of 330 points above the U.S. treasury
rate. By June 1999, the Wall Street Journal would editorialize that “there
never was any doubt that preventing money from ﬂeeing Malaysia could
provide short-lived relief” (25 June 1999, A18).
The Wall Street Journal notwithstanding, whether (and the extent to
which) Malaysian controls contributed to economic recovery remains a
highly debated matter. Some scholars, such as Merton Miller, continue to
view the controls as an unmitigated disaster.11 The mainstream view is that
it is hard to attribute much success to the capital controls because Korea
and Thailand also recovered around the same time without using capital
controls. Lim’s (1999) account is worth quoting at length, as it is represen-
tative:
Following the imposition of capital controls, economic indicators in
Malaysia did indeed start improving. But they also improved at the same
time in the other crisis-hit countries which did not impose such controls
but maintained open capital accounts. All the crisis-hit countries’ cur-
rencies stabilized and strengthened, their inﬂation and interest rates fell,
their current accounts moved from deﬁcit into substantial surplus and
private capital inﬂows increased, contributing to the replenishment of
previously depleted foreign exchange reserves. Their stockmarkets
started climbing, and the decline in their GDP growth rates moderated
sharply and have now reversed with positive growth predicted for 1999 as
a whole everywhere except Indonesia. Until very recently, the recovery in
Malaysia actually lagged behind that of its neighbors who were IMF pa-
tients, particularly in inﬂows of foreign direct investment which fell in
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11. Miller was quoted in the Asian Wall Street Journal as saying that “the experiment with
controls was at best useless....  T h e  bad news is that the episode was actually harmful to
Malaysia and its citizens” (9 July 1999.)1998 whereas they increased in the other countries (except Indonesia).
My own opinion is that capital controls in Malaysia were neither neces-
sary nor suﬃcient for economic recovery, just as they have obviously not
been necessary in the equally if not more impressive recovery of the other
crisis-hit Asian countries which followed the more conventional IMF
policy prescriptions. Indeed, given Malaysia’s much stronger macroeco-
nomic fundamentals and ﬁnancial institutions before the crisis, one
would have expected its recovery to be faster and stronger than that of the
other countries. That this has not happened suggests that capital con-
trols—or the heightened political risk which accompanied their imposi-
tion—may be exerting a drag on recovery through the discouragement of
some foreign capital inﬂow.
Even sympathizers of capital controls have taken a cool attitude toward the
success of Malaysian policies (Krugman 1999b; Jomo 2001), on essentially
the same grounds: There was a recovery even in the countries that did not
impose controls. Krugman (1999b) writes, “the market panic of 1997–98
was, it turns out, coming to an end just about the time that Malaysia de-
cided to make its big break with orthodoxy.”
We shall challenge the view that the ﬁnancial crisis in Malaysia was about
to abate in September 1998 and that an economic recovery was around the
corner. Financial market indicators suggest that pressure on the Malaysian
currency remained high in Malaysia months after the Korean and Thai cur-
rencies had begun to appreciate. It is clear that the Malaysian authorities
acted because they believed a sharp change in policies was “needed to avert
an imminent ﬁnancial panic” (Liu 2000, 284). The situation in which
Malaysia found itself on 1 September 1998 was akin to that which had
forced Thailand and Korea to call in the IMF quite a while back (in July and
October 1997, respectively). Moreover, if it is the case that the timing of the
ﬁnancial crisis was diﬀerent in Malaysia, the fact that Korea and Thailand
began to recover at the same time that Malaysia did is not very informative
about the relative eﬀectiveness of the Malaysian controls.
8.3 Methodological Considerations
In evaluating the consequences of the Malaysian capital controls, it is
natural to use as a counterfactual the experience of the other Asian coun-
tries aﬀected by the crisis. This is in fact the strategy adopted by the au-
thors cited above, albeit informally and often implicitly. A diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences speciﬁcation is the appropriate framework for thinking about
this question.12Let yitdenote some measure of economic performance of in-
terest, where tstands for time and istands for one of our four countries (i 
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12. See Meyer (1995) for a good discussion of the methodological issues in diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimation.Malaysia, Korea, Thailand, Indonesia). Consider the following represen-
tation:
(1) yit  ∑
i
 idi    dt      dMdt     uit,
where dt is a country-speciﬁc dummy variable (dM   1 when i   Malaysia
and 0 otherwise, and so on); dt  is a time-varying dummy variable that takes
the value 1 during the twelve months (or four quarters) that follow   1
September 1998 (i.e., during the one-year period subsequent to the imposi-
tion of capital controls in Malaysia), and is 0 otherwise; and uit is the error
term. This speciﬁcation allows yit to have a country-speciﬁc, time-invariant
intercept (captured by  i). It also allows yit to be inﬂuenced by a common
underlying factor during the period that the capital controls were in use in
Malaysia (i.e., while the “treatment” is in eﬀect). This time-varying but
common eﬀect is captured by the coeﬃcient  . The coeﬃcient of greatest
interest is the one on the interaction term dMdt  ,  , which captures the dif-
ferential eﬀect of the capital controls in Malaysia. With this speciﬁcation,
the average post–September 1998 performance of the comparators (relative
to their earlier performance) becomes the counterfactual used in estimating
the eﬀectiveness of the Malaysian policies.
Equation (1) represents the conventional application of the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences approach to this case. It has the merit that it controls for (“diﬀer-
ences out”) the eﬀects of both country-speciﬁc and time-varying inﬂuences
that might otherwise be attributed to the use of capital controls. In particu-
lar, a common improvement across countries in fundamentals that co-
incides with the use of capital controls in Malaysia gets washed out by
the term  dt  . We shall present empirical estimates using this approach
later on.
However, there is a serious problem with conventional diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences. For  to be an unbiased estimate of the eﬀect of the capital con-
trols, an essential identifying condition must hold—we must assume that
Malaysia would have experienced the same economic recovery as the other
countries in the months following September 1998 had capital controls not
been imposed. This is implausible for three reasons that we shall elaborate
at greater length later in the paper: (1) The timing of the ﬁnancial crisis was
somewhat diﬀerent in Malaysia. During the summer of 1998, market pres-
sure on Malaysia’s currency remained very high, whereas the crisis had
already abated in Korea and Thailand. Malaysia’s policy configuration
during the summer of 1998 looked fundamentally unsustainable. (2) Korea
and Thailand had, by September 1998, already undergone nine and ﬁfteen
months of “treatment,” respectively. In addition, they had both received
large loans. It is diﬃcult to believe that Malaysia would have been able to
recover immediately to the level of these other countries. (3) Assuming that
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ward the end of 1998, there were further ﬁnancial repercussions ahead. An-
war was viewed as the guardian of economic orthodoxy in Malaysia, so his
dismissal would likely have aggravated the ﬁnancial panic.
We will discuss these issues further in the next section. For now, let us
simply assume that the Malaysian crisis was deepening in late summer 1998
and that the prevailing policies were unsustainable. Consider the implica-
tions for our empirical methodology of the diﬀerence in the timing of the
crisis and policy response. We would like to know what Malaysia’s perfor-
mance would have been in the absence of capital controls. The answer re-
quires specifying a counterfactual policy response. Luckily, we have a nat-
ural counterfactual: going to the IMF for help. This is the course of action
that the other countries took once they reached a point in the crisis that re-
quired emergency measures. This way of specifying the counterfactual pro-
vides us with an alternative identifying assumption: In the absence of capi-
tal controls, Malaysia would have had to request IMF assistance to shore
up conﬁdence, and its post–September 1998 economic performance would
have exhibited the same change that the other economies experienced sub-
sequent to their requests for IMF assistance.
This calls for a time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation, of the
following form:
(2) yit  ∑
i
 idi    dt  i    dMdt  i   uit
The main diﬀerence from before is that the time-varying post-treatment
dummy is now country-speciﬁc (i.e., dt  i instead of dt  ), which reﬂects the
argument that the treatment was applied in diﬀerent countries at diﬀerent
times. The dummy dt  i equals 1 during the twelve-month period following
country i’s ﬁrst appeal for IMF assistance (and, in the case of Malaysia,
during the twelve-month period following the imposition of capital con-
trols), and is 0 otherwise.
With this change, the parameters   and   acquire somewhat diﬀerent in-
terpretations from those in the conventional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences:  
captures the eﬀect of undergoing IMF treatment during an economic crisis
(relative to outcomes in more normal times), whereas   captures the diﬀer-
ential eﬀect of capital controls in Malaysia (compared to an IMF program).
The speciﬁcation does not allow us to gauge the eﬀects of an IMF program
per se, because we observe an IMF program only during a crisis. Thus,  
picks up a mix of IMF and crisis eﬀects. This is not a major concern because
our main interest, once again, is in the parameter  . Under the assumption
that Malaysia implemented its capital controls at a stage in the ﬁnancial cri-
sis that is comparable to that at which the other countries called in the IMF,
  is an unbiased estimate of the eﬀect of the Malaysian controls relative to
the counterfactual of an IMF program. Note moreover that   picks up the
404 Ethan Kaplan and Dani Rodrikeﬀects not just of the capital controls, but of the entire post–September
1998 Malaysian package—including the ﬁxed exchange rate, reﬂation via
interest rate cuts, and so on.13 In particular, it includes the impact of receiv-
ing many billions of dollars in loans from the IMF.
A simple analogy helps provide the basic intuition behind the time-
shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach we have just outlined. Suppose
that two twin sisters, Corinne and May, both catch a virus that, left un-
treated, will simply continue. Assume that Corinne receives a standard
treatment on Sunday. Assume further that May receives no treatment until
Wednesday but then receives a special treatment. If we do a standard diﬀer-
ence-in-diﬀerence analysis, ignoring the fact that the two sisters fell ill on
diﬀerent days, we might look at the diﬀerence in the fevers of the two sisters
on, say, Friday versus Wednesday. We would then attribute the change in the
diﬀerence between the sisters’ fevers to the medicine that May received.
However, such a calculation would be almost certain to lead to the conclu-
sion that the special medicine made the patient worse oﬀ. By Wednesday,
Corinne has started to recover, while the medicine that May took may not
have worked fully.
In this particular case, the disease is the same across individuals, and the
individuals are assumed to react to both the disease and any potential med-
ication in an identical manner. Therefore, it is obvious that a more fruitful
approach is to compare the time path of the disease after application of the
conventional medicine with the time path of the disease following the ap-
plication of the special treatment. In other words, we would want to time
shift across sisters to match the application of the medicine. Replace
Corinne with Korea, and May with Malaysia, and the logic of our approach
becomes identical.
While time shifting corrects the type of bias just discussed, it creates the
potential of another bias. The main risk that we run by using a time-shifted
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach is that there might be a correlation be-
tween the external economic environment and dt  i. More concretely,
Malaysia may have imposed its controls in a much more favorable environ-
ment than prevailed at the time that Korea (or Thailand or Indonesia) im-
plemented its IMF program, and this in turn may account for a substantial
part of the speedier recovery in the former country. We cannot entirely rule
out this possibility, but we make the following points in our defense.
First, as we shall show below, it is not at all obvious that the external en-
vironment was improving for Malaysia during the second half of 1998 in the
way that it had been for Thailand and Korea. Pressure on the ringgit re-
mained very strong, even though the Korean won and Thai baht had al-
ready started to appreciate. Interest rates in both Korea and Thailand had
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13. This is not cause for worry, because these additional policies were enabled in large part
by the imposition of capital controls.declined signiﬁcantly, whereas oﬀshore interest rates on ringgit deposits re-
mained in double digits. The recession in Korea and Thailand had already
bottomed out by September 1998, with Korea in particular exhibiting a
healthy rebound, but there were no indications of a similar easing-up in
Malaysia. Second, it is not obvious that an improvement in the external en-
vironment, to the extent that it did take place, would have produced much
beneﬁt for a country that actually cut itself oﬀ from international ﬁnancial
markets by implementing capital controls.14 To the extent that the controls
were eﬀective, they would have insulated Malaysia from an improvement in
market sentiment (which is in fact an argument that the opponents of cap-
ital controls have made). Finally, we try to reduce the scope for spurious
correlation by introducing in our time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences re-
gressions several time-varying indicators related to the external context—
namely, U.S. interest rates, U.S. inﬂation rates, U.S. economic activity, and
(in the quarterly regressions) a measure of net ﬁnancial ﬂows to the region.
8.4 Timing and Magnitude of the Malaysian Financial Crisis
Financial indicators for the period suggest that the Malaysian economy
was not as hard hit as Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia at the outset of the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis, but that things grew progressively worse for Malaysia
even as the pressure eased in Korea and Thailand. We show this using a
simple indicator of ﬁnancial market “pressure” for the three countries.
The ﬁnancial market pressure index is calculated as a weighted average of
the (log) exchange rate, (log) foreign currency reserves (with declines in re-
serves contributing positively to the index), and the interest rate. This index
is similar to the speculative pressure index constructed by Eichengreen,
Rose, and Wyplosz (1995). The idea is that ﬁnancial market pressure must
be reﬂected in a decline in the value of the home currency, a decline in re-
serves, or an increase in interest rates. As weights, we use the inverse of the
monthly standard deviations of each of the indicators, pooling the data for
the three countries over the 1989–2000 period. This serves to underweight
the more volatile components of the index. In Malaysia’s case, we use the
oﬀshore interest rate rather than the onshore rate, as the former is the more
relevant indicator of speculative pressure. Interest rate caps within Ma-
laysia had made the domestic interest rate largely irrelevant.15
Figure 8.1 shows our ﬁnancial market pressure index for the 1996–2000
period. It is clear from the ﬁgure that the speculative attacks diﬀered in their
timing. Thailand was hit ﬁrst, with the peak of the crisis occurring in Sep-
tember 1997. Korea followed with a few months’ lag, reaching a peak in
406 Ethan Kaplan and Dani Rodrik
14. Indonesia, for one, did not beneﬁt very much from the return of investor conﬁdence to
the region, for reasons that are speciﬁc to its own circumstances.























































)January 1998. Malaysia was behind both countries, and it began to experi-
ence a sustained increase in the index only during the early months of 1998.
The peak value of the index for Malaysia was reached in August 1998, just
before the imposition of the capital controls. (The sharp decline in the Malay-
sian index in September 1998 was due to the closing oﬀof the oﬀshore mar-
ket and the ﬁxing of the ringgit at an appreciated rate). Note that through-
out 1998 the ﬁnancial pressure index for Malaysia moves in the opposite
direction from that for Thailand and Korea. This is a rather clear indication
that speculative pressure continued to build up in Malaysia at a time when
the other two countries were beginning to breathe more easily.
We can achieve some insight into the reason the indices that the three
countries behave so diﬀerently by observing the trends in the components
of the index. Figure 8.2shows interest rates, with both onshore and oﬀshore
rates displayed for Malaysia. Note the very rapid rise in oﬀshore rates for
ringgit after May 1998, at a time when Korean and Thai interest rates were
receding from the heights reached in late 1997 and early 1998. Just prior to
September 1998, the oﬀshore market was oﬀering ringgit rates of between
20 and 40 percent to attract domestic ringgit (compared to the 11 percent
oﬀered by banks in Malaysia). These ringgit deposits were used to fund the
short ringgit positions that oﬀshore banks, hedge funds, and portfolio in-
stitutions held in expectation of a sharp depreciation.16 The consequent
leakage of ringgit abroad was a major reason that the desired credit expan-
sion within Malaysia failed to take place and that the investment rate plum-
meted.
Figure 8.3displays foreign currency reserves. Here the diﬀerence between
Malaysia and South Korea is especially striking. Korean reserves sharply
rebounded in early 1998, while Malaysia’s reserves continued to fall. There
is no increase in Malaysian reserves until after September 1998. This is also
reﬂected in currency values, as the ringgit continued to depreciate from the
end of March (after a rebound in the ﬁrst quarter of the year) while the won
steadily appreciated (ﬁg. 8.4).
By the summer of 1998, Malaysia was viewed from the outside as a coun-
try in deep trouble. The media and ﬁnancial markets were rife with specu-
lation that Malaysia was next in line for an IMF program. The headline of
an article in Barron’sis representative: “Malaise-ia: While Kuala Lumpur Is
in Denial, It May Be Next for IMF Aid” (6 July 1998, 28). The trouble was
attributed variously to the sidelining of Anwar, the intemperate remarks of
Mahathir about the international ﬁnancial system, and the unsustainability
of the reﬂation policies in view of the pressure on the currency. Far from be-
ing out of the woods, the Malaysian economy in late August 1998 was still
mired in a financial quagmire. Whether this was partly its own doing is
408 Ethan Kaplan and Dani Rodrik






































































































































































Cirrelevant from our current perspective.17 The crucial point is that
Malaysia’s policy framework in September 1998 looked as fragile as Thai-
land’s had been in July 1997 or Korea’s in November 1997.
Moreover, the impending dismissal and jailing of Anwar—assuming
Mahathir was intent on getting rid of his onetime ally regardless of eco-
nomics—would surely have made the ﬁnancial crisis signiﬁcantly worse. As
Perkins and Woo (2000, 230) note:
Mahathir had foreseen that Anwar’s expulsion would lead to violent
street demonstrations that, in turn, would induce large capital outﬂow,
given the extreme nervousness among investors in the midst of the ﬁnan-
cial crisis....  I f  the capital controls had not been in place when the street
demonstrations began, the Malaysian ringgit (MR) and the Kuala
Lumpur stock market would most likely have gone into a free fall in the
manner that the Indonesian rupiah and the Jakarta stock market did in
May 1998, just before Soeharto stepped down from the presidency.
As we pointed out above, ﬁnancial markets viewed Anwar as the guardian
of economic orthodoxy in Malaysia and an important counterweight to
Mahathir. His removal—whether accompanied by riots or not—would
have been an occasion for a run on the ringgit.
This is important insofar as it suggests that the relevant counterfactual
for how the Malaysian economy would have evolved absentcapital controls
must include the consequences of Anwar’s ﬁring. Therefore, not only was
Malaysia in dire ﬁnancial straits on the eve of the imposition of capital con-
trols, but there is also good reason to believe that the worst was yet to come.
8.5 Empirical Results
The basic regression we estimate is an augmented version of equation (2),
discussed previously:
(3) yit  ∑
i






k   uit,
where yit is a measure of economic performance that is of interest (for ex-
ample, growth); di is a set of country dummies; dt  i is the “treatment-
period” dummy, which equals 1 during the twelve-month (or four-quarter)
period following country i’s ﬁrst appeal for IMF assistance or, in the case of
Malaysia, during the twelve-month (four-quarter) period following the im-
position of capital controls, and is 0 otherwise; dMdt  i is the interaction
term of the Malaysia dummy with dt  i; X j
it is a set of country-speciﬁc time-
varying variables (country-speciﬁc monthly or quarterly dummies): Zt
k is a
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17. One ought to remember also that neither Thailand, with its explosive current account
deﬁcit and oﬀ-balance sheet sales of its reserves, nor Korea, with its huge and partly disguised
short-term foreign liabilities, had been paragons of ﬁnancial virtue.set of time-varying variables capturing the external economic environment
(U.S. interest rates, U.S. inﬂation, a measure of U.S. economic activity
[monthly industrial production index or quarterly real GDP], a measure of
net private ﬁnancial ﬂows to the region [in the quarterly regressions], and a
time trend); and uit is the error term. Note that the speciﬁcation includes a
time trend as well as country-speciﬁc monthly or quarterly dummies (to
guard against possible spurious correlation arising from seasonality in the
timing of treatment in diﬀerent countries). The external economic environ-
ment is controlled for by the inclusion of Zt
k. The parameter   establishes
the baseline post-treatment response, while   is our estimate of the diﬀer-
ence that is attributable to capital controls in Malaysia.18
The data come mostly from the International Financial Statistics of the
IMF. Stock market data are from the Emerging Markets Database, and
Malaysian employment and wage data are from the Monthly Manufactur-
ing Statistics of Malaysia. Where possible, we use monthly data, but be-
cause many indicators of real economic activity are available only on a
quarterly basis, we supplement the monthly regressions with quarterly re-
gressions as well. The regressions cover the period 1992–96 (“before”) and
the one year of treatment (“after”). In a few cases, data availability dictates
a shorter time span for the “before” period.19
Table 8.2 shows the timing of the treatment windows for each country.
Our focus is on the one-year period following the seeking of IMF assistance
or the imposition of capital controls. This seems to us to be the relevant time
span for answering our central question about the speed and vigor of the re-
covery. In the case of Malaysia, this corresponds to the September 1998–
August 1999 period (1998:4–1999:3 in the quarterly regressions). For the
other countries, we pick a starting point that follows as closely as possible
the date at which the country ﬁrst requested IMF assistance. We pick that
date rather than the date of program announcement or IMF board ap-
proval (also shown in table 8.2) because the time lag between these dates, re-
ﬂecting the bargaining and negotiation with the IMF, seems to us to be a
relevant part of the counterfactual.20Note that the timing is somewhat more
precise with the use of monthly data.
We shall focus on comparisons with Korea, in the ﬁrst instance due to the
more complete data availability in Korea (in comparison with Thailand and
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18. Note that with the inclusion of other covariates on the left-hand side of our regression,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient is a diﬀerence that is conditional on the covariates.
19. When we include 1997 data in the regressions, the time-shifted results are even more fa-
vorable to the Malaysian controls.
20. Had Malaysia gone to the IMF, the implementation of policies would have been delayed,
because a certain amount of time would have been lost in negotiations with the IMF on the de-
sign of the program. With capital controls, Malaysia was free to implement its policies instan-
taneously. However, as a robustness check we have also run the regressions taking as the start-
ing point of treatment the date of signing of the letter of intent. This change makes no










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Indonesia) on real indicators. However, Korea also has the advantage that
it is considered to be the IMF’s most successful patient in the region. Since
our results indicate that Malaysian controls were also quite successful, it is
useful to subject them to a particularly demanding test. Showing that
Malaysia did better with its policies than Indonesia did with an IMF pro-
gram would be hardly convincing, as one might credibly argue that Indo-
nesia’s failure arose from idiosyncratic reasons.
Table 8.3 shows the core results, using both time-shifted and conven-
tional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approaches. We present only the coeﬃcient
estimates for   and   and their standard errors for each version of the re-
gression, suppressing other regression output for ease of readability. The
way to read the table is as follows. Consider the ﬁrst row, which shows the
results for industrial production. The numbers indicate that in the twelve-
month period subsequent to calling in the IMF, Korea witnessed a reduc-
tion in its industrial output growth relative to trend of 15.1 percentage
points (  –0.151). In Malaysia, the reduction in growth following the im-
position of capital controls was 5.2 percentage points lower than in Korea
(  0.052), or 9.9 percentage points (  15.1 – 5.2). Both numbers are esti-
mated precisely and are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Note
that these estimates are conditional on the other controls in the regressions,
namely country-speciﬁc monthly dummies and the time-varying external
variables listed previously.
The last two columns show the corresponding estimates for the conven-
tional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach. These results are quite diﬀerent
and are less favorable to Malaysia. They suggest that Malaysia’s post–Sep-
tember 1998 growth lagged signiﬁcantly behind Korea’s during the same
period—a diﬀerence in fact of 16.7 percentage points.
The remaining rows repeat the exercise for other variables of interest. The
time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences yield consistently strong (and in all
cases statistically signiﬁcant) results in favor of capital controls. Compared
to Korea, Malaysia suﬀered a smaller reduction in manufacturing employ-
ment (a diﬀerence of 19.1 percent), a smaller drop in real wages (a diﬀer-
ence of 10.8 percent), a smaller drop in the stock market (a diﬀerence of
22.3 percent), a larger reduction in interest rates (a diﬀerence of 3.9 per-
centage points), less currency depreciation (a diﬀerence of 18.5 percent),
and a smaller increase in inﬂation (a diﬀerence of 1.8 percent). All of these
estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
Once again, the conventional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences paint a diﬀerent
picture, although the general pattern is less uniform than in the time-shifted
case. In some cases these agree with the previous estimates (in particular
with regard to employment and real wages). The most striking discrepan-
cies arise, aside from industrial output, for interest rates (a relative increase
in Malaysia of 4.9 percent) and inﬂation (a relative increase in Malaysia of
2.4 percent).











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.The bottom panel of table 8.3 recalculates the regressions using as com-
parators all three countries (Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia) wherever
data are available. The coeﬃcients   and   now have to be interpreted as
pertaining to averages for the comparators as a group. The general pattern
of results is quite similar to those just reported. Malaysia comes out look-
ing very good in the time-shifted regressions and not so good in the con-
ventional ones. The presence of Indonesia in the comparator sample has a
large inﬂuence on some of the outcomes—note, for example, the whopping
interest rate and inﬂation results in the time-shifted regressions.21
In table 8.4, we present similar estimates with respect to performance
measures that are available only on a quarterly basis. For comparison pur-
poses, we also repeat the exercise using quarterly versions of some of the
monthly series we discussed above (industrial production, manufacturing
employment, real wages, and the stock market index). The time-shifted re-
sults are essentially unchanged. With regard to the new variables, we ﬁnd
very strong eﬀects for real GDP growth (a diﬀerence in favor of Malaysia of
5.7 percentage points) and private consumption growth (a diﬀerence of 8.6
percentage points). We also ﬁnd a larger reduction in the government sur-
plus, although this is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
How do we interpret these results? Critics of the IMF have argued that
the IMF programs in the region aggravated the crisis and exacerbated ﬁ-
nancial panic (at least during the initial months) by calling for excessively
contractionary monetary and ﬁscal policies, by mandating bank closures,
by overreaching in structural reforms, and by not putting enough pressure
on creditors for an early standstill on debt repayment.22 Our ﬁndings are
consistent with this critique. Taken together, the time-shifted diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimates suggest that the Malaysian policy was more successful
in immediately reducing interest rates, stabilizing the currency, and stem-
ming ﬁnancial panic. This success eased, for the short term at least, worries
that the banking system would go under and that there would be a devalu-
ation spiral. The turnaround in market conﬁdence was correspondingly
more rapid. In addition, ﬁscal policy was on balance more expansionary.
All these in turn spurred consumption and economic activity.
We would therefore hypothesize that there were two channels through
which the capital controls worked. One was the standard Keynesian policy
of demand reflation, implemented through expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies. The other, and perhaps more operative, channel was the
420 Ethan Kaplan and Dani Rodrik
21. An alternative approach would be to add country-speciﬁc interaction terms for Thailand
and Indonesia, in which case the same diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcients can be recovered
by subtracting the  s across countries. Because we are interested mainly in the outcomes for
Malaysia vis-à-vis the rest of the countries, we do not report those results.
22. Critics diﬀer in their weighting of these diﬀerent factors. For a variety of critical views,
see Krugman (1999a), Radelet and Sachs (2000), Feldstein (1998), Furman and Stiglitz (1998),

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.removal of the substantial uncertainty about the ﬁnancial system and the
exchange rate, uncertainty that had previously depressed conﬁdence and
business activity. In other words, capital controls worked to revive demand
not only because they allowed the government greater monetary and ﬁscal
autonomy, but probably also because they enabled the return of a modicum
of stability to ﬁnancial markets.23However, we need further research before
we can make a strong case for either of these channels.
Finally, we note that by choosing capital controls over the IMF, Malaysia
missed out on the large capital injections that Thailand and Korea received.
This makes it even more surprising, if the time-shifted estimates are to be
believed, that Malaysian policy outperformed Korean and Thai policy. It
would be interesting to know how Malaysian capital controls would have
worked had they been accompanied by billions of dollars in loans. We have
nothing to say about this counterfactual except to suggest that it would cer-
tainly have improved the performance of Malaysia relative to Korea and
Thailand.
8.6 Some Alternative Interpretations
We have argued that the time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences provide a
more accurate estimate of the eﬀects of Malaysia’s capital controls because
the most likely alternative to them was not to wait passively for recovery to
take hold but to undergo an orthodox program similar to that implemented
in the other countries some months earlier. We shall now review some al-
ternative readings of the evidence that are less favorable to the controls.
Malaysia was not confronted with a serious economic crisis of the type
faced by the other countries. This view essentially argues that the time-
shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation is not valid because the crisis
was much worse in Thailand and Korea than in Malaysia, so that the diﬀer-
ence in average performance reﬂects a diﬀerence in the level of the crisis
rather than a diﬀerence in the policy response. This argument usually takes
one of two forms. The ﬁrst version asserts that Malaysia’s economic prob-
lems were largely due to the verbal antics of its prime minister. A second ver-
sion is that the Malaysian crisis was mostly due to the political uncertainty
surrounding the internal battle for power between Mahathir and Anwar.
Both sources of uncertainty were reduced dramatically with the imposition
of the controls and the ﬁring of Anwar on 2 September 1998.
We do not take a position on whether Malaysian policy prior to Septem-
ber 1998, in combination with Prime Minister Mahathir’s behavior, led to
an unnecessarily large economic downturn. Nevertheless, it is clear that
Malaysia was in the midst of a very severe real economic crisis, one compa-
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23. With a precautionary motive for saving, reduced uncertainty should lead to increased
consumption.424 Ethan Kaplan and Dani Rodrik
rable with the crises experienced by Thailand and Korea, by the time the
controls were implemented. The crisis went considerably beyond the ﬁnan-
cial market pressure on the ringgit. Looking at table 8.5, we can see that
Malaysia had a larger contraction in economic activity prior to the controls
than Korea did at any time during its crisis. Also, in the quarter during
which Malaysia implemented controls, the country experienced a larger re-
duction in output than Korea ever sustained.24 Given the evidence on out-
put contraction, we believe that it is not tenable to discount the Malaysian
crisis as somehow a ﬁction and due mostly to capital controls.
Malaysia simply beneﬁted from the improvement in the external environ-
ment. This represents the standard view of the Malaysian recovery, and we
have already given some reasons to be skeptical of it. First, it is not at all
clear that Malaysia was beneﬁting much from the return of investor conﬁ-
dence to the region, which was already under way in September. As we have
seen, ﬁnancial indicators in Malaysia were moving in the direction opposite
to those in Korea and Thailand. Even setting aside Anwar’s forthcoming
political demise, there is no reason to presume that conditions would have
improved for Malaysia any time soon. They certainly did not for Indonesia.
Nor did they for Russia or Brazil, which were hit by ﬁnancial panic some
months later.
Second, even if one thinks that the pressure against the ringgit was about
to ease up, it is not clear why Malaysia would have beneﬁted from the im-
provement in investor sentiment after having imposed capital controls to
insulate itself from ﬁnancial market conditions. This is a problem, espe-
Table 8.5 Measures of Economic Activity in Korea and Malaysia Before and After Policy
Implementation: Growth Rates (%)
GDP Exports Consumption Investment
Korea Malaysia Korea Malaysia Korea Malaysia Korea Malaysia
–4Q 6.45 7.44 6.83 11.30 9.76 8.16 8.55 17.16
–3Q 4.83 5.49 7.18 17.45 8.12 –3.44 2.55 –3.43
–2Q 6.04 –3.19 20.04 21.42 7.38 –14.69 4.70 –26.40
–1Q 5.31 –5.36 21.40 17.92 7.32 –16.74 –1.23 –58.17
Policy 3.53 –11.54 32.15 8.94 0.36 –23.67 –4.48 –80.18
1Q –4.75 –10.83 54.62 4.45 –11.43 –11.44 –21.50 –57.60
2Q –8.29 –0.75 33.35 0.19 –9.15 1.50 –25.25 –34.42
3Q –8.45 3.93 24.38 10.62 –7.29 5.28 –25.65 –19.18
4Q –6.13 8.59 3.45 15.79 –0.22 10.40 –21.05 1.89
5Q 5.27 9.56 –26.97 18.40 10.99 6.65 –2.51 1.65
Source: IMF (various issues).
24. Malaysia implemented capital controls in the last month of the third quarter, so that
most of the decline in third-quarter output occurred before the implementation of the controls.cially if one is predisposed toward open capital accounts as a general rule.
It is diﬃcult to argue that capital controls isolate an economy from the ben-
eﬁts of ﬁnancial markets while maintaining that one receives the same ben-
eﬁts regardless of whether one has capital controls or not.
Finally, as we have already pointed out, we do include in our regressions
the salient features of the external environment. In particular, we include a
measure of total net ﬁnancial ﬂows to four countries in the region (South
Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand) in the quarterly regres-
sions (table 8.4).25 This measure is displayed in ﬁgure 8.5. The net outﬂow
from these countries averaged $8.0 billion in the ﬁrst four quarters after Ko-
rea went to the IMF, but only $1.7 billion in the ﬁrst four quarters of the
Malaysian controls.26 We also control (in both our monthly and quarterly
regressions) for U.S. interest rates, which fell signiﬁcantly in October 1998.
Since we control for these diﬀerences, our results must be interpreted as the
eﬀect of capital controls after netting out the impact of the external envi-
ronment.
Malaysia’s recovery was essentially due to the IMF-style policies it had put
in place in 1997. A related argument is that the IMF-type policies that
Malaysia followed while Anwar was still in charge of economic policy were
bearing fruit and that the recovery is attributable to the delayed eﬀect of
these policies rather than the controls. As we mentioned above, there is in
fact scarce evidence that the real economy was about to turn around in
Malaysia. If anything, the economy was sinking deeper as time went on.
While it is impossible to be deﬁnitive on this score, it is instructive to
compare Malaysia’s performance prior to September 1998 with Korea’s.
Figure 8.6 shows a measure of the “output gap” in industry for the two
economies, calculated as the residual from a regression of the industrial
output index on a time trend and monthly dummies. The ﬁrst thing that is
clear from the picture is that the recessions in the two economies were not
perfectly synchronized: Malaysia’s recession lagged behind Korea’s, which
supports our argument that the timing of the crisis was diﬀerent in these
countries. More to the point in the current context, it is clear that Korea’s
turning point came in July of 1998, while Malaysia continued to deteriorate.
(Malaysia was not the only country in the region for which this was true: In-
donesia continued to experience severe decline throughout 1998 and into
1999.) The Malaysian economy bottomed out months later, in January
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25. Since ﬁnancial ﬂows are available only on a quarterly basis, we could not include a sim-
ilar measure in the monthly regressions. The latter do include other proxies for the external en-
vironment, however—namely, U.S. interest rates, inﬂation, and industrial production.
26. Flows to the region are obviously endogenous, but introducing this variable in the re-
gressions biases the results against the Malaysian policies: If the large outﬂow while countries
were under IMF programs is the result in part of the poor performance of those economies,
“controlling” for these outﬂows makes the IMF programs look more successful. Removing





































































”1999. In other words, by September 1998 one could have been reasonably
conﬁdent that the Korean recovery had begun. There were no such signs in
Malaysia.
Malaysia made things worse for itself by delaying decisive policy action.We
have little disagreement with the view that Malaysia would have been bet-
ter oﬀ had it been able to resolve its diﬃculties before September 1998.
However, this is largely irrelevant to the question at hand, and not simply
because all the countries in the region experienced their share of self-
inﬂicted harm.
Would Malaysia have been wiser to go to the IMF in late 1997 instead of
waiting for another year and reacting as it did in late 1998? Perhaps. How-
ever, on the basis of the evidence presented here, one might also argue that
Malaysia would have fared even better if it had imposed capital controls
sooner—better than with an earlier IMF remedy, and better than it did sub-
sequently. There is presumably less of a downside to capital controls when
capital is leaving the region (as in 1998) than when it is coming back (as in
1999). Furthermore, to the extent that delay makes the eventual policy ad-
justments more costly, our results must underestimate the relative advan-
tage of capital controls.
8.7 Concluding Remarks
We posed three questions at the outset about the near-term consequences
of the Malaysian capital controls. Were the controls eﬀective in segmenting
ﬁnancial markets and providing breathing room for monetary and ﬁnancial
policies? Did they allow a speedier recovery than would have been possible
via the orthodox IMF route? Did they allow the leadership to do politically
nasty things? We have given aﬃrmative answers to all three questions. The
longer-term question about the country’s access to FDI and other forms of
external ﬁnance is harder to answer with the available evidence, and we have
not said much about it.27
This paper’s main contribution has been to recast the comparison be-
tween Malaysia and the other countries in the region in a manner that, to
our mind, makes more sense. Previous comparisons have asked how
Malaysia performed relative to Korea or Thailand after September 1998.
We have asked instead how Malaysia performed compared to Korea or
Thailand when the latter were undergoing their IMF programs (although
we made allowance for changes in the external environment). We have
shown that the first approach yields answers that on balance make the
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27. There are indications that FDI into Malaysia may have slowed down and that bond
spreads have remained a bit higher in relation to other countries in the region (Liu 2000). On
the other hand, Korea and Thailand are left with large debts to the IMF and other interna-
tional lending institutions; Malaysia did not accumulate such debts.capital controls look bad. The second approach yields answers that make
the controls look very good.
Our preferred counterfactual is based on the view that Malaysian policies
in the summer of 1998 were unsustainable, that the pressure against the
ringgit was building up, that the economic decline was not about to be re-
versed on its own, and that the realistic alternative to the capital controls
was an IMF program of the type that the other countries undertook. For
our results to be credible, it must also be the case that we have adequately
controlled for the external environment. On the other hand, the conven-
tional counterfactual requires us to believe that the intense oﬀshore specu-
lation against the ringgit was about to stop of its own accord, that the
Malaysian economy was about to turn the corner even without any funda-
mental change in policies, or that an IMF-style program would have pro-
duced an immediate recovery for Malaysia (even though Korea’s and Thai-
land’s IMF programs did not do so).
In closing, we simply invite the reader make up his or her mind about
which of these counterfactuals makes more sense, and to form conclusions
accordingly.
Appendix
Malaysian Controls on Capital and Exchange Controls, 
1–2 September 1998
1. Malaysia ﬁxed the exchange rate at MYR3.80 per U.S. dollar.
2. Prior approval was required for nonresidents to be able to buy or sell
ringgit forward.
3. All sale of ringgit assets was required to be transacted through ap-
proved domestic intermediaries. This eﬀectively shut down the operation of
the oﬀshore ringgit market.
4. Nonresidents were required to obtain BNM approval to convert ring-
git held in external accounts into foreign currency, except for the purchase
of ringgit assets in Malaysia or for the purposes of conversion and repatri-
ation of sale proceeds of investment made by foreign direct investors.
5. Settlements of imports and exports were required to be settled in for-
eign currency. However, free exchange was maintained for all current ac-
count transactions in addition to supply of trade credit to nonresident ex-
porters of Malaysian goods.
6. Credits to external accounts were limited to salaries, wages, rentals,
commissions, interest, proﬁts, dividends, or sale of foreign currency, ringgit
instruments, securities, or other assets in Malaysia.
7. Debits to external accounts were restricted to settlement for purchase
Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work? 429of ringgit assets and placement of deposits; payment of administrative and
statutory expenses in Malaysia; payment of goods and services for use in
Malaysia; and granting of loans and advances to staﬀ in Malaysia.
8. Domestic nationals were forbidden to export more than MYR10,000
during any travels abroad. Foreign nationals were forbidden to export more
than MYR1,000 upon leaving Malaysia.
9. After 1 September 1998, nonresident sellers of Malaysian securities
were required to hold on to their ringgit proceeds for at least twelve months
before repatriation was to be allowed.
10. A ban was placed on the provision of domestic credit to nonresident
correspondent banks and stockbroking companies.
1999 Changes in Controls
1. As of 15 February 1999, the year-long moratorium on repatriation of
investments was replaced with a graduated tax. All capital having entered
Malaysia before this date were subject to the following levies on the capital
being removed: (a) 30 percent if repatriated within the ﬁrst seven months af-
ter entering Malaysia, (b) 20 percent if repatriated between seven and nine
months after entry, (c) 10 percent if repatriated between nine and twelve
months of entering, and (d) no levy if repatriated after one year of entry.
2. For funds entering Malaysia after 15 February 1999, capital was free
to enter and leave without taxation; however, proﬁts were taxed at the rate
of 30 percent if repatriated within one year of entry and 10 percent if repa-
triated after one year of entry.
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The paper by Kaplan and Rodrik is an important contribution to the well-
known debate on capital controls. Views on the desirability and eﬀective-
ness of capital controls have changed quite signiﬁcantly over the last three
decades. As is often the case, consensuses are questioned and revised after
a major international ﬁnancial crisis, and those on capital controls have not
been the exception. For example, although in the 1970s there were large
numbers of supporters of capital controls, the debt crisis of the 1980s
brought about a renewed emphasis on the beneﬁts of capital account liber-
alization. Many perceived capital controls, especially to the outﬂows, as an
incentive to perpetuate “bad” domestic policies and, therefore, to generate
capital ﬂight. To a large extent, multilateral organizations praised the ben-
eﬁts of capital account liberalization, while recognizing that appropriate
stabilization policies and structural reforms were needed as preconditions
for establishing capital account convertibility on a sustainable basis.1Albeit
to very diﬀerent degrees, a large number of emerging markets embarked on
a process of freeing international capital transactions as part of their over-
all reform eﬀorts.
This consensus was revised again after the severe banking crisis that ac-
companied the exchange rate crisis in Mexico in mid-1994. The crisis led a
number of analysts to identify the beneﬁts of capital controls to the inﬂows
as a “prudential” device to avoid intermediation of large amounts of short-
term capital inﬂows through weak banking systems. These controls have
taken a variety of forms including taxes, quantitative restrictions, and re-
serve requirements discriminating against short-term deposits denomi-
nated in foreign currency. A policy response to large capital inﬂows that has
gained increased acceptance with International Monetary Fund (IMF)
oﬃcials is a combination of controls on short-term inﬂows and liberaliza-
tion on all other kinds of ﬂows (outﬂows and long-term inﬂows).
The East Asian crisis of the late 1990s brought about a renewed interest
in the discussion of capital controls. This time around, the motivation was
provided by the drastic controls to the outﬂows imposed by Malaysia on
1 September 1998. If capital controls to the outﬂows were assessed to be a
malaise of such long-term consequences, why did Malaysia, which imposed
controls in the midst of the crisis against the advice of markets and multilat-
eral organizations, seem not to have paid a higher price in terms of economic
recovery than the rest of the Asian countries, which abstained from impos-
432 Ethan Kaplan and Dani Rodrik
Liliana Rojas-Suarez is a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics.
1. As is well known, important contributions to the literature by Frenkel (1982) and Ed-
wards (1989) concluded that the opening of the capital account should occur late in the se-
quencing of stabilization and structural reform programs in emerging markets in order to
avoid capital ﬂows that would make the reforms unsustainable.ing controls? Moreover, could it have been the case that the imposition of
controls actually beneﬁted Malaysia by accelerating the recovery process?
Kaplan and Rodrik deal with this issue by posing two fundamental ques-
tions: (a) were capital controls in Malaysia eﬀective in segmenting Ma-
laysian ﬁnancial markets from oﬀshore and international capital markets,
and (b) did the capital controls allow a faster economic recovery than what
could have been achieved under an IMF program? In both cases, their an-
swer is yes. The evidence presented in response to the ﬁrst question is that
the controls resulted in the death of the oﬀshore ringgit market and allowed
domestic interest rates to decrease. To respond to the second question, the
authors used a time-shifted diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences methodology (rather
than the conventional diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences) to identify the economic
outcomes resulting from the controls. Although the authors are very care-
ful in pointing out the limitations of the chosen methodology as well as the
issues that require further research, the clear policy conclusion that readers
of this paper derive is that capital controls to the outﬂows can be a desirable
policy tool with which to confront severe external pressures against the ex-
change rate.
In commenting on this paper, one can follow diﬀerent paths. It is tempt-
ing to stress the limitations of the methodology and the restrictive assump-
tions needed and, in general, to question the real value of a counterfactual
approach in an environment where so many other things are changing. I
will, however, resist the temptation to follow that route and instead oﬀer a
quite diﬀerent interpretation of the events.
Let me start by pointing out that I strongly believe that a serious analysis
on capital controls in Malaysia needs to go beyond the sole focus on the
controls to the outflows in September 1998 to incorporate the eﬀects that
the history of temporary capital controls on inﬂows had on the economy.
Throughout the 1990s Malaysia imposed a series of temporary capital con-
trols. Starting with limits on non–trade-related swap transactions on com-
mercial banks in June 1992 and following with a long list of controls to
inflows that lasted for most of 1994 (combined with the outspoken
“antispeculators” statements of Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mo-
hamad), agents dealing with Malaysian securities became aware that sud-
den changes in the rules governing transactions of cross-border ﬁnancial
ﬂows were not only possible but likely.2 This, together with limits on inter-
est rates set by the central bank (Bank Negara Malaysia), gave a strong im-
petus to the growth of the oﬀshore ringgit market, which was free of regu-
lations and controls.3
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2. For a summary of controls imposed in Malaysia during the 1990s, see Reinhart and Smith
(1997).
3. The Central Bank sets the base lending rate (BLR). In addition, it enforces a ceiling over
the BLR as the maximum that banks can charge borrowers for most type of loans. See
Kochhar et al. (1999).The motivation for imposing controls during the mid-1990s was to pre-
vent speculative inﬂows that could lead to an excessive appreciation of the
real exchange rate. As is usually the case, the policy intention of containing
the inﬂows was twofold: to maintain monetary policy independence and to
avoid a possible sudden reversal of the inﬂows and the concomitant adverse
eﬀects to economic and ﬁnancial stability. While the controls were success-
ful in the short run in containing the real appreciation of the ringgit, my
overall assessment of the experience is that the long-run outcome was neg-
ative, as the controls contributed to the exacerbation rather than the ame-
lioration, of the large outﬂows of 1997–98. I explain this contention in the
following paragraphs.
Subsequent to the imposition of controls on inﬂows, a typical pattern
emerged: In the face of proﬁtable opportunities, controlling a market cre-
ates incentives to “shift” the market somewhere else, either abroad or to the
informal sector (as with Latin America in the 1980s). This is exactly what
happened in Malaysia, as evidenced by the growth and deepening of the
oﬀshore ringgit market. As often happens, during good times (1995–96) de-
velopments in the oﬀshore market did not conﬂict with the conduct of do-
mestic monetary policy, because the behavior of oﬀshore interest rates was
consistent with domestic monetary policy. However, as experience also
shows, attempts to segment markets prove extremely diﬃcult in bad times
(1997–98). Aware that Mahathir would resist sharp increases in domestic
interest rates in the presence of the overall economic slowdown that fol-
lowed the Thai crisis and weaknesses in domestic ﬁnancial markets, specu-
lators perceived an opportunity to short the currency.4 They did so in the
“eﬃcient” oﬀshore market, raising interest rates to more than 40 percent
when domestic rates were kept at only 10 percent. The resulting massive
capital outﬂows to ﬁnance the speculation were inevitable. In other words,
by creating the market conditions to allow for large and quick building of
positions against the currency, the temporary capital controls imposed be-
fore September 1998 had long-run adverse consequences. Indeed, contrary
to the argument that the temporary controls to the inﬂows in the mid-1990s
limited the extent of the outﬂows in 1997–98, I would argue that the mech-
anisms and instruments developed in the oﬀshore market after the inﬂow
controls allowed for a very rapid transfer of large amounts of resources
abroad.
It is in this context that Malaysia imposed drastic capital controls on out-
ﬂows on 1 September 1998. How one interprets their eﬀectiveness largely
depends on what side of the debate one is on. If one is a defender of capital
controls, one will argue, like Kaplan and Rodrik, that the controls worked
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4. The extremely high ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP reﬂected the large
amounts of bank credit dedicated to the purchase of stock (see Dornbusch, chap. 9 in this vol-
ume). In this environment, it was easily perceived by speculators that sharp increases in do-
mestic interest rates would have severe adverse consequences to domestic ﬁnancial markets.because they killed the oﬀshore ringgit market and, therefore, stopped the
speculation. However, even assuming that the authors are right and that the
speculation was not dying at the time controls were imposed (as argued by
International Monetary Fund [IMF] reports; see, e.g., IMF 1999), the crit-
ical issue to me is that the attack did not have to start in the ﬁrst place—at
least, not with the severity it did. The combination of a “relative” low do-
mestic interest rate policy, domestic ﬁnancial fragilities, and a free oﬀshore
market that had grown enormously because of the history of controls in
Malaysia was deadly. The oﬀshore ringgit market attracted large amounts
of capital outﬂows, and that capital was gone at the time the controls were
imposed on 1 September 1998. True, the controls killed the ringgit market,
but to call that “eﬀective” is, from my point of view, a somewhat near-
sighted account of events. My view is that although temporary drastic cap-
ital controls can work in the short run, they also have permanent adverse
eﬀects in the long run and tend to reduce the eﬀectiveness of intended poli-
cies.
However, Malaysia recovered after the imposition of capital controls to
the outﬂows, and if this recovery can be attributed even partly to the impo-
sition of drastic controls to the outﬂows, many would ﬁnd the controls jus-
tiﬁable. Once again, however, there is no consensus about the causes of the
recovery. While Kaplan and Rodrik ﬁnd evidence that Malaysia’s output
performance was better oﬀ with the controls than with the counterfactual
of an IMF program, others argue that external events such as the sharp cut
in U.S. Federal Reserve rates were at the core of the recovery of the Asian
economies, including Malaysia. Given the multiplicity of fast-moving
events taking place in the international capital markets, I think the rela-
tionship between economic recovery and outﬂow controls in Malaysia will
remain an unresolved issue.
Kaplan and Rodrik support their empirical exercise by arguing that the
relevant and realistic alternative to the capital controls in Malaysia was an
IMF program, similar to the ones in Korea and Thailand, rather than the
continuation of existing policies. Although I can see the merits of analyzing
the alternative “counterfactuals,” the truly interesting question from my
point of view is why capital controls to the outﬂows were indeed an option
open to the Malaysian authorities. Isn’t the fear of a potential lack of access
to international capital markets a powerful deterrent for countries to follow
this policy? We did not see other countries in the Asian region or elsewhere
reacting to the crisis with the imposition of drastic controls. Why was
Malaysia diﬀerent? I believe that the best answer to this question can be
found in Haggard and Low’s (2000) interpretation of events. Mahathir did
not fear exclusion from international capital markets because Malaysia had
secured funds from Japan through his outspoken support to Japanese for-
eign policy initiatives, the most prominent one being a Japanese-centered
Asian Monetary Fund. Indeed, as shown by Haggard and Low, Japan be-
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1998–2000, including funds from the Miyazawa Initiative.
Thus, to me, the lessons are quite diﬀerent from those than can be derived
from Kaplan and Rodrik’s paper. First, examining the entire recent history
of capital controls in Malaysia leads me to conclude that controls were part
of the problem and not part of the solution. It was because of the problems
generated by temporary controls on inﬂows in the mid-1990s that radical
measures against the outﬂows became a policy choice.
Second, an emerging market does not have to fear loss of access to inter-
national capital markets if it can negotiate ﬁnancial resources on a political
basis. Will we see the emergence of a Japan-dominated Asian Monetary
Fund as the result of political agreements between countries in the region?
Could such an institution be eﬀective in helping to prevent crises, or would
the political arrangements exacerbate the moral hazard problem and, in-
stead, contribute to unsustainable policies? Of course, it is now too early to
attempt to provide answers to these questions.
Understanding the Malaysian events fully also allows us to explain why
other regions of the emerging-market world, such as Latin America, could
not be in a position to deal with the international ﬁnancial crisis and avoid
contagion through capital controls. The straightforward reason is that
Latin America was not in a position to secure access to international
sources of funds beyond those available in the international capital markets
or through multilateral organizations.
In 1993, I wrote a paper with Don Mathieson on the issue of capital con-
trols (“Liberalization of the Capital Account”). Our conclusion was that
the eﬀectiveness of capital controls could at best be only temporary and that
it depended on initial conditions (the degree of economic and ﬁnancial im-
balances). I believe that our basic conclusion remains as valid now as it was
then, but the Malaysian experience has added an interesting new dimension
to the analysis. Among initial conditions, the oﬀ-market political capacity
to arrange for external (or internal) sources of funds needs to be taken into
account.
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Discussion Summary
Nouriel Roubini disputed the view that the Malaysian capital controls were
eﬀective. According to him, in the summer of 1998 when the controls were
imposed, the speculative pressure from the hedge funds was already relieved
as a result of the hedge funds’ huge losses following the Russian default, the
intervention in Hong Kong, and the reversal of the yen. He said that hedge
funds had already begun to reduce their positions in these countries at that
time, which led to a major appreciation of the currencies of Australia, New
Zealand, Singapore, and South Africa.
Roubini also noted that the overall market conditions in Malaysia before
the crisis were better than in other crisis countries: The current account
deﬁcit was mostly ﬁnanced by foreign direct investment, and the real de-
preciation of the ringgit was not as large as in other countries. Despite this,
he said, the recession in Malaysia during the crisis was as deep as in other
countries, and this implied that there was a lot of political rhetoric against
speculators in Malaysia.
Finally, Roubini said the data suggested that Malaysia had similar expe-
riences as other countries. It was growing at a speed similar to that of other
countries until 1997, was struck by as big a recession as the others in 1998,
and recovered similarly afterward. For example, the fall of nominal interest
rates in Korea and Thailand (where no capital control was imposed) be-
tween September and December 1998 was as sharp as in Malaysia. In ad-
dition, Malaysia was eﬀectively following an IMF program during the cri-
sis period. He concluded that all the evidence suggests that there is no
diﬀerence eﬀectively across crisis countries and no evidence to support the
claim of the eﬀectiveness of capital control policies in Malaysia (relative to
the IMF programs followed by other countries).
Shang-Jin Wei pointed out that some of the largest negative eﬀects of
capital controls are potentially the loss of conﬁdence and foreign invest-
Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work? 437ment and the diﬃculty for the country to access foreign capital markets.
Therefore, it is striking that the paper found that foreign direct investments
in Malaysia were not aﬀected. Wei also suggested studying the possible dif-
ferential eﬀects of capital controls on diﬀerent forms of capital flows in
addition to those on the total amount of capital ﬂows.
Martin Feldstein commented that the wealthy Chinese minority in In-
donesia, which used to be protected by the Suharto regime, pulled out its
capital at the fall of Suharto. He asked if the Chinese minority played a
comparable role in Malaysia and if this posed a considerable risk for the
Mahathir regime. Feldstein also asked how the authorities in other Asian
countries think of the Malaysian capital control policies as a way to deal
with currency crises.
Eduardo Borensztein emphasized international trade as an important
part of the external environment. He said that the reason Korea and Thai-
land did not experience much export expansion after their large devaluation
was regional; that is, exports to Asia dropped dramatically. He said that the
recovery of the region was very important and explained why the recovery
of Malaysia was synchronized with other countries in the region.
On whether the controls were eﬀective, Borensztein added that foreign di-
rect investors could circumvent the control policies through big loopholes,
as their remittance and dividend payments were not constrained. Had there
been a large diﬀerential in interest rates, multinational companies could
easily have circumvented the controls. He said that the fact that we did not
see these evasive actions on the part of multinationals suggests that the con-
trols were probably not binding.
Robert Deklenoted that the capital controls of Malaysia imposed in 1994
reduced its capital inﬂow relative to the GDP dramatically (from 2.00 per-
cent to 0.02 percent). He said that this was why Malaysia had much less cap-
ital inﬂow than other countries in 1997 and that it also played a key role in
saving Malaysia from the contagion of the crises.
Roberto Rigobon made the remark that the results of the paper were
partly driven by the data on interest rates, which were aﬀected by the oﬀ-
shore interest rates. He pointed out that the ﬁnancial indices constructed
with overnight interest rates on stock markets or exchange rates would date
the Malaysian crisis much before December 1998 because the devaluation
of the ringgit was much greater and overnight interest rates were much
higher in 1997. He asked if the ﬁnding on the eﬀectiveness of capital con-
trols would be robust to these indices. Rigobon also commented that the
ﬁnding that capital controls were not, at least, damaging, is a point worth
emphasizing, given that most priors about the capital control policies are
that they are costly.
Charles W. Calomiris noted that the external environment controls
mainly had to do with the United States, which is a major source of the im-
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change rate changes of Malaysia’s export rivals in the regression.
John McHale asked why Malaysia was under such a great ﬁnancial pres-
sure in the middle of 1998. He suggested that one possible explanation
could be that Malaysia was perceived as a country that would contemplate
imposing capital controls and the investors had an incentive to get their
money out of the country. The option of imposing capital controls in diﬃ-
cult circumstances can therefore create a situation in which it is actually
needed, remarked McHale.
Sebastian Edwardsemphasized that when evaluating the control policies,
it is important to note that Malaysian capital controls were temporary. He
said this is a diﬀerent situation from the earlier controls reported in his
book on exchange rate crises (1999), in which he looked at forty major crises
in the 1960s and 1970s and found that capital controls were imposed mostly
after the crises and were not lifted after a long period (three years).
Ethan Kaplanﬁrst said that he agreed with the comments that the long-run conse-
quences of the capital control policies are not clear. He said that the paper addressed
a more modest question, namely, whether capital controls were eﬀective in terms of
increasing various measures of real and ﬁnancial performance, such as growth rates,
consumption, investments, and trade.
To the criticism that one cannot compare the experience of Malaysia to
that of Korea and Thailand to identify the eﬀects of capital controls be-
cause the controls were imposed during a big political change, Kaplan an-
swered the following. He said that this is a general problem with cross-
sectional analysis, especially when there are so few observations (countries)
and so many characteristics that vary. One has to make a judgement re-
garding which variables to include, which cannot be done without a prior
on what matters and what does not. In the paper, he and Dani Rodriklooked
for the main diﬀerence between the eﬀect of the imposition of control poli-
cies in Malaysia versus the eﬀect of the IMF program in other countries,
and the results were in favor of Malaysia. He said that one can oﬀer several
alternative explanations that are consistent with the ﬁndings, such as polit-
ical changes in Malaysia or external regional eﬀects. Nevertheless, Kaplan
said that he believed that capital controls had a decent impact.
On the nature of the diﬀerent experiences of Malaysia and other crisis
countries, Kaplan said that their preliminary study suggested that, among
the components of GDP, the diﬀerences on the impact for GDP lie in con-
sumption and imports.
Rodrik said that although one could argue about the exact reason for
Malaysia’s recovery after September 1998, it was not obvious that this re-
covery would have automatically occurred at that time. Although Korea
had clearly begun to recover in September 1998, there was nothing similar
going on in Malaysia at that point.
Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work? 439One concern of the Malaysian authorities was social stability and the
interethnic balance between the Chinese and Malay communities, which
was extremely important for the political leadership. After seeing the ex-
perience of Indonesia after the IMF program, which intensiﬁed tension and
led to interethnic strike, Malaysian authorities were determined to avoid
such an outcome. Rodrik said that capital control policies had social bene-
ﬁts if one thought of their role in maintaining the interethnic balance in the
face of the potentially explosive situation in Malaysia.
Finally, Rodrik emphasized that the capital control policies were not the
same as the IMF programs implemented in other crisis countries. For ex-
ample, when the IMF came the interest rates went up and banks were
closed, whereas with capital controls the interest rates were reduced and
there were no bank closures. The ﬁscal policy proposed by the capital con-
trols was expansionary from the outset as opposed to starting from a con-
traction and changes over time in the IMF program. Moreover, the ex-
change rate was ﬁxed under capital controls rather than being allowed to
ﬂoat and therefore suﬀering a much greater depreciation subsequent to hav-
ing an IMF program. Finally, the issue of the resolution of the uncertainty
was also very diﬀerent. Once it was clear that the controls were going to be
eﬀective, they resolved the uncertainty in the system eﬀectively, which
played an important role in the recovery. On the other hand, Rodrik recog-
nized that capital control policies did have distributional consequence;
some of the beneﬁts of the stability were reaped by the cronies of Mahathir.
Rodrik concluded by saying that even though it was true that Malaysia
looked no diﬀerent from an average crisis country in terms of real perfor-
mance, this does not necessarily mean much. Malaysia could have gone the
Indonesian way and done much worse, or imposed capital controls sooner
and—on the evidence in the paper—done better.
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